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Abstract
Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelec-
tion and rents from oﬃce holding. Can it be optimal from their
point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureau-
cracies? The answer is yes: politicians will delegate some policy
tasks, though in general not those that would be socially optimal
to delegate. In particular, politicians tend not to delegate coali-
tion forming redistributive policies and policies that create large
rents or eﬀective campaign contributions. Instead they prefer to
delegate risky policies to shift risk (and blame) on bureaucracies.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The questions of whether and why politicians delegate substantial deci-
sion power to various bureaucracies are fundamental for understanding
the organization of governments. Clearly in many (in fact most) policy
areas bureaucrats act under a more or less direct supervision of elected
politicians, who retain the ultimate decisions power. But this is not the
focus of our paper. The focus here is on the cases in which substantial
decision power is delegated to bureaucrats who act with almost complete
independence.
On the ﬁrst question, (whether) there is little doubt that the answer
is yes and Epstein and O’ Halloran (1999) provide an excellent survey of
the literature. For sure there are controversies about the extent and the
pros and cons of such delegation; some authors (Lowi (1969) amongst
others) argue that delegation in the US is too extensive and deleterious,
an abdication of the legislators’ responsibility and a way of favoring
∗We thank participants in a seminar at Stanford University for useful comments.
1special interests (Stigler (1971)). Other authors (Mc Cubbins, Noll and
Weingast (1987, 1989)) instead claim that the legislators can, at least
up to a point, control the bureaucratic agencies by means of procedural
rules. Carpenter (2001) dissents and argues instead that the rise of
the regulatory state has given a large latitude to many bureaucracies
to decide in addition to implementing legislation. Overall it would be
hard to argue that high level bureaucrats have no decision power at all.
In many cases, in fact, bureaucratic agencies are given a very broad
task and are free to perform such task rather independently. Think of
the Central Bank for example, whose goals are to keep inﬂation low
and stabilize the business cycle; most Central Banks around the world
and especially in industrial democracies are quite independent; so are
many regulatory agencies; on the other hand, foreign policy is almost
exclusively in the hands of politicians.
So, clearly politicians do delegate substantial decision power in some
areas, but then, and this is the second question, why? Two are the
potential answers. One is ”optimistic” and relates to the need for divi-
sion of labor, allocation of skills, solving commitment problems1.O t h e r s
are more cynical: Epstein and O’ Halloran (1999) argue that the type
of delegation chosen is the one that maximizes the beneﬁts for elected
politicians rather than social welfare; this is precisely what we model in
the present paper.
We revisits this question (why delegate?) using a model based on the
presumption that politicians and bureaucrats are motivated by diﬀerent
incentives. Politicians want to be reelected, bureaucrats want to be
perceived as competent in performing a task assigned to them. For
example the main goal of an American President is to win reelection in
his ﬁrst term and to favor his party’s reelection in his second term of
oﬃce.2 On the contrary, a Central Banker’s goal is to appear competent
at managing monetary policy, both for his rewards in oﬃce but especially
for his future career. In economic jargon this is referred to as a ”career
concern model” for the bureaucrat . Career concerns can be interpreted
broadly. They could refer to employment prospects in the private sector,
but also legacy, fame, recognition. Thus, this paper asks the following
question: when is it in the interest of politicians to take advantage of the
incentive structure that determines bureaucratic behavior and delegate
certain tasks to independent bureaucratic agencies?
1On solving time inconstistency problem by delegation see Rogoﬀ (1985) for an
original contribution and Persson and Tabellini (2002) for an overview of the litera-
ture
2See Alesina and Spear (1988) for a formal discussion of electoral incentives for
second term Presidents.
2We show that politicians want to delegate: 1) tasks that have neg-
ative net rents (rents extracted minus costs of performing the task);
2) task that do not bring about suﬃcient campaign contributions from
special interests; 3) areas of policymaking that are especially risky, i.e.
where much can go wrong, in a way that resembles the blame switching
incentives pointed out by Fiorina (1977). On the contrary, politicians
do not want to delegate purely redistributive tasks, because they are
especially useful to build winning coalitions.
These results capture at least some aspects of actual government
organizations. For a start, politicians are especially keen on holding
on to policies which are extremely sensitive form a distributive point
of, like most aspect of ﬁscal policy. Trade policy is especially prone to
generate campaign contributions and in fact is very politicized. On the
other hand, monetary policy has a risky nature (think at how economists
disagree on its eﬀects!) and in fact it is delegated to independent Central
Banks often used as scapegoats when things do not turn out as well as
hoped.
These criteria for delegation have little if anything to do with what
”should” be delegate from a society’s welfare maximization point of view.
In Alesina and Tabellini (2004) we use the same framework of the present
paper to give a normative answer to this question; that is we explore how
a Constitution written behind a veil of ignorance would attributes tasks
to elected politicians and bureaucrats. The present paper has a positive
rather than normative focus and discusses the more realistic case in
which elected politicians decide what to delegate and what to retain for
themselves.
Our paper is related to several recent contributions that have inves-
tigated the role of career concerns rather than explicit contracts in mo-
tivating bureaucrats, such as Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a,b)
and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). Maskin and Tirole (2001) inves-
tigate the attribution of responsibilities between accountable and non
accountable agents where the latter have intrinsic motivations, while
the former seek to please their principals. Schultz (2003) focuses on
the trade-oﬀ between ideological polarization and accountability. Besley
and Gathak (2003) also study intrinsically motivated agents, and Besley
and Coate (2003) contrast appointed and elected regulators of public
utilities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the simplest
case of our model and justiﬁes its assumptions. Section 3 characterizes
the relationship between the choice of delegation and electoral results in
several cases. Section 4 focuses on purely redistributive policies. Sections
5 analyzes the role of risk in policymaking. The last section concludes.
32 The Model
With the term policymaker we indicate the agent that performs a cer-
tain task, (i.e. makes decisions in a certain policy area and implements
such decisions) so the policymaker can be either the politician or the
bureaucrat, depending on whether a task is delegated or not.
Suppose for simplicity that there are two tasks with outcomes y1 and
y2. The utility function of the voters, who are all identical, is simply:
U(y1,y2)=y1 + y2 (1)
We assume risk neutrality for now but we introduce risk aversions (i.e.
curvature in the utility function) below. Each task requires costly eﬀort
(a) and ability (θ) from the policymaker in an additive manner:
yi = θi + ai i =1 ,2( 2 )
The two task-speciﬁc abilities, (θ1,θ 2), are independently distributed
a c c o r d i n gt oan o r m a ld i s tribution with mean ¯ θ and variance σ2
θ.T h e
costs of eﬀort are additively separable so that total costs are (c1 + c2),
where:
ci = C(ai),i =1 ,2( 3 )
with Ca(ai) > 0a n dCaa(ai) > 0. Thus the cost function is the same for
both tasks and convex, meaning that marginal costs are increasing in
eﬀort.
We deﬁne an allocation of tasks between politicians and bureaucrats
the speciﬁcation of who does what. We ﬁrst illustrate the model for a
given allocation of tasks. Then we discuss the allocation choice by the
incumbent politician.
For concreteness, suppose that task 2 has been delegated to the bu-
reaucrat and task 1 is instead retained by the politician. This task
allocation is known and understood by the voters. Each policymaker
chooses eﬀort in his assigned task, so as to maximize his reward net of
the cost of eﬀort:
R
J(ai) − C(ai)
where J refers to the policymaker’s type, namely the bureaucrat or the
politician. The rewards for the politician and the bureaucrat are diﬀer-
ent and are described in the two next subsections. The timing of events
under this task allocation is as follows. First, both politician and bu-
reaucrat choose eﬀort in their respective tasks. Since there is no comple-
mentarity nor substitutability, there is no strategic interaction between
4policymakers and whether they move simultaneously or in a sequence
is irrelevant. Both policymaker types choose eﬀort before knowing the
realization of their own ability. Then performance is observed, utility is
enjoyed by the voters and rewards are paid and elections take place.
The assumption that abilities are not observed by the policymaker
before the task is implemented makes the analysis simpler, since it re-
moves any informational asymmetry between principals and agents. We
now describe the policymakers’ behavior, starting with the bureaucrat.
2.1 The bureaucrat
We posit that bureaucrats are motivated by the goal of appearing com-
petent in fulﬁlling the tasks assigned to their organization. Speciﬁcally,
we model bureaucratic behavior according to the career-concerns frame-
work of Holmstrom (1999). 3 This means assuming that bureaucrats
are concerned with the perception of their ability θ2 in the eyes of those
who may then promote them or oﬀer them alternative job opportuni-
ties in the private sector. More generally, the career concern mat also
incorporate a desire for legacy, recognition, and fame.
Speciﬁcally, given that the bureaucrat has been assigned task 2 and
that his performance y2 is publicly observed, we assume that the bu-
reaucrat’s reward is (the suﬃx B stands for Bureaucrat):
R
B(a2)=α ¯ E(E(θ2 | y2)( 4 )
where α is the market value of talent, namely how much talent is re-
warded, and ¯ E denotes unconditional expectations while E denotes ex-
pectations of θ2 conditional on the observation of y2.In words, the re-
ward of the bureaucrat is proportional to the conditional expectation
of his ability by outside observers (the term E(θ2 | y2)), evaluated be-
fore knowing the random determinants of performance, y2 (hence the
unconditional expectations ¯ E operator).
This formulation implies that: the market’s evaluation of the bu-
reaucrat’s talent is formed looking at his performance, y2; for instance,
for a Central Banker this would be maintaining price stability. Once
again, one should interpret this reward for talent very broadly. A central
banker may know that he will retire at the end of his term, but he still
cares about going down in history as successful banker.
Using (2), we can rewrite (4) as follows
R
B(a2)=α ¯ E(E(θ2/a2 + θ2)=α ¯ E(a2 − a
e
2 + θ2)( 5 )
3See also the more recent and comprehensive analysis by Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999a and b).
5where ae
2 is the public anticipation of a2.
Equilibrium behavior of the bureaucrat is obtained as follows. First,
compute the ﬁrst order condition with respect to eﬀort, a2, taking the ex-
pected level of eﬀort ae
2 as given. Then, impose the rational expectation
equilibrium requirement, that ae
2 = a2.4 The result is:
α = Ca(a
B
2 )( 6 )
where aB
2 indicates the equilibrium eﬀort of the bureaucrat. Clearly the
higher is α the larger is the eﬀort put in by the bureaucrat. Keeping
this simple result in mind, we normalize α =1 .
2.2 The politician
Next, turn to the politician. His goal is to be reelected. We do not allow
any career concerns for the politician, he only cares about reelection.5
The timing of events is the same as for the bureaucrat. In the eyes of
the voters, the politician is responsible only for performing task 1 since
they are aware of the task allocation, namely who does what.
Voters re-elect the politician if his performance in task 1 does not
fall below a given threshold W. Normalizing to 1 the value of holding
oﬃce, we can write the reward function for the politician as (the suﬃx
P stands for Politician):
R
P(a)=P r ( y1 ≥ W)( 7 )
In words, the reward of the politicians is the value of holding oﬃce ( 1)
multi plied by the probability of winning namely the probability that the
voters are suﬃciently happy with the observed result of policy making
as to reappoint the incumbent.
Now we need to determine the voters’ threshold, W. We impose ratio-
nality of the voters, so that they expect that the alternative to reelecting
the incumbent is to get another one with average talent, who in equi-
librium will put the same amount of eﬀort as the current one. In fact
every period is identical and the politician’s eﬀort choice is made before
he observes his talent.6 It follows that:




2 as given when the optimal level of eﬀort is chosen, and then imposing
the equilibrium condition a2 = ae
2, implies that the public’s expectation of eﬀort is
consistent with what the bureaucrat ﬁnds it optimal to do.
5This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that the politicians care about
reelection and career concerns. Conceptually the extension is completely straightfor-
ward, but it clutters algebra and notation. See Alesina and Tabellini (2004) for some
results along this line in a diﬀerent context..
6Note that the model could be easily generalized to several periods, if the politi-
cian’s ability today is a signal of his ability tomorrow but some random element of
6Like the bureaucrat, the politician chooses eﬀort before observing
his talent, taking the voters’ expectations as given. With a normal
distribution for θ, equilibrium eﬀort by the politician, aP
1 , is deﬁned
implicitly by the ﬁrst order condition:
n(¯ θ)=Ca(a
P
1 )( 9 )
where n(¯ θ)=1 /σθ
√
2π is the density of the normal distribution of θ eval-
uated at its mean. In general we do not know whether the policymaker
or the bureaucrat puts more eﬀort.
Finally, note that the higher is the variance of ability, the lower is
the left hand side of this expression and the lower is the eﬀort exerted
by the politician. A larger variance of ability dilutes the incentive of
the politician. This result will be exploited in the next section to derive
some implications about the task allocation preferred by the politician.
2.3 Discussion and interpretation
It is important to pause to discuss how these strawmen of ”politicians”
and ”bureaucrats” relate to real world ﬁgures. Probably the most com-
pelling example of a ”bureaucrat” as modelled here is a Central Banker.
H i si n c e n t i v e st of u l ﬁll his task are mostly driven by the desire to appear
competent, although even a Central Banker occasionally may bend to
the electoral needs of a ”politician”.7 Like our ”bureaucrat”, a Central
Banker sets policy without political interferences and his tasks are set by
ac l e a rm a n d a t et ok e e pi n ﬂa t i o nl o w .A nA m e r i c a nP r e s i d e n ti si n s t e a d
the quintessential example of a politician, seeking reelection for himself
in his ﬁrst term and for his party in his second.
In reality these distinctions may not be so clear cut. In fact, bu-
reaucrats in charge of important agencies may be preparing a leap into
politics, so they may worry about their popularity and not only their
competence per se. On the contrary, politicians may look ahead to a
career in the private sector; for instance a second term President may
certainly look at his party fortune but also at his legacy which can be
very closely approximated by perception of talent. While these caveats
point to a large gray area and intermediate cases between our ”politi-
cian” and our ”bureaucrat”, it is useful as a ﬁrst step to clearly identify
how career concerns and electoral incentives lead to diﬀerent behavior
depending on the nature of the policy in question.
ability is present every period so that it can never be fully learnt in advance. A widely
studied case in the political business ccycle literature is that of a MA (1) process for
abiity. Persson and Tabellini (2000) discuss the implications of this political model
more extensively.
7The case of Arthur Miller in 1972 is an illustration, but very few would argue
that Alan Greenspan is motivated primarily by the desire to please a President.
7Another important observation is on the interpretation of the costs
of eﬀort. The way the model is written, they can be thought of costs of
working more or less hard, shorter or longer hours. But they can easily
be reinterpreted in a rent extraction model; i.e. more rents extracted
by the politician would imply less utility for the voters. Speciﬁcally,
one could rewrite the policy outcome as yi = θi − ri where subscript
i indicates the two tasks and r are the rents extracted by the policy-
maker. Then, instead of the costs of eﬀort, the policymaker would have
a strictly concave and increasing utility over rents, say V (r). This alter-
native notation would deliver the same results. So every time we write
”more eﬀort” we could rewrite it as ”less rents” etc. More generally one
could have both costs of eﬀort and utility of rents, which would be the
most general case but also the most cumbersome notationally. While we
continue using the ”costs” notation, the reader should keep in mind the
more general interpretation.
Finally, note that the bureaucrat is restricted to perform the task
assigned to him. He cannot choose a diﬀerent task. This assumption
is realistic and reasonable for several reasons. First, not performing the
assigned task may reﬂect negatively on the perception of the bureaucrat;
a Central Banker ignoring inﬂation to focus on writing treaties on for-
eign policy would not receive high marks, regardless of how brilliant his
theories are. Second, bureaucrats are not chosen at random. Somebody
chosen to be a Central Banker will have a predisposition to be good in
ﬁnancial matters, and therefore will choose to signal his abilities in those
matters.
3 The choice of delegation
Now we can address the question of whether and when the politician
chooses to delegate. Remember that by ”delegation” we mean appoint-
ing a really independent bureaucrat who has decision power over a policy
area. The timing is as follows: ﬁrst the elected politician chooses the
allocation of tasks. Then the policymaker in charge chooses eﬀort under
the same timing described above (i.e., ﬁrst eﬀort is chosen, then ability is
determined, ﬁnally performance is observed and rewards are paid). For
simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the politician
faces a binary choice: either he delegates task 2 to an independent bu-
reaucrat, or he keeps it for himself; task 1 is instead restricted to always
remain with the politician.
The voters’ behavior is a crucial determinant of the delegation choice.
This in turn depends on what the voters know. We assume throughout
that voters observe the task allocation (i.e. they know who does what)
and fully understand its implications (alternative assumptions are dis-
8cussed below). Thus, the delegation choice is equivalent to a choice
amongst rational equilibria, a choice made by the politician. In other
words when making a delegation decision the politician can compute
which equilibrium will be associated with one choice or the other. With
forward looking voters, we also need to specify whether the politician’s
choice about allocation of tasks is expected to remain in place only in the
current period, or also in the future. In line with the observation that
bureaucratic institutions can be changed through ordinary legislation,
we assume no commitment: the task allocation in place today could be
changed after the election. Thus, an equilibrium allocation of tasks is
deﬁned as one that meets two requirements: ﬁrst, it is optimal for the
incumbent politician, given the voters’ expectation of the allocation of
tasks after the elections and given how policies are chosen under each
allocative scheme; second, the voters’ expectations about future task
allocations are rational and fulﬁlled in equilibrium.
3.1 Delegation and electoral results
Remember that voters care only about the bottom line (i.e their own
utility) and (at least for now) they are risk neutral. Under these as-
sumptions section 1 of the appendix proves that:
Proposition 1 If voters are risk neutral, then in equilibrium the prob-
ability of reelecting the incumbent politician is always 1/2, irrespective
of task allocation. Hence, the politician chooses the task allocation that
minimizes his equilibrium costs - or more generally, that maximizes the
equilibrium net rents from being in oﬃce.
Proposition 1 makes clear that electoral concerns do not drive the
delegation choice with risk neutral voters. The reason is that voters
condition re-election on policy performance, but not on the choice of
task allocation per se. This in turn follows from the assumption that
voters are rational and forward looking and understand the implications
of alternative allocation choices, while they are imperfectly informed
about the policymaker’s ability in carrying out his policy tasks. In other
words, voters compare today’s performance to a reservation utility which
is what voters expect to get from the opponent, taking into account the
task allocation that the opponent would choose once in oﬃce.
Intuitively, suppose that a politician delegates even though the voters
would be better oﬀ without delegation; why would they not throw out
the incumbent? The reason is that they know that next period the
challenger in oﬃce would make the same decision about delegation, thus
not reelecting the incumbent does not buy a better delegation decision.
9The relevant concern of voters is whether or not their vote will give them
a better policy for tomorrow.
Given that the probability of re-election is always 1/2 irrespective
of the delegation arrangement, the only criteria governing the choice of
delegation by the politician concern the costs of eﬀort (or more generally
the rents associated with each task). Speciﬁcally, if performing task 2
according to the voters’ expectations is, on net, costly for the politician,
then he prefers to delegate it. If instead retaining control of task 2 allows
the politician to grab political rents in equilibrium (net of the cost of
performing the task), then he prefers to retain it under his control.
This general insight (that tasks entailing costly eﬀort are delegated
away, while tasks entailing rent extraction are retained) can be further
reﬁned on the basis of more speciﬁc details. First, it is possible to show
that the politician has generally weaker incentives to please the voters
if he retains two tasks rather than with a single one. Thus, equilibrium
eﬀo r tb yt h ep o l i t i c i a ni ne a c ht a s ki sl o w er (rents are higher) if he retains
two tasks. The intuitive reason is that the politician is less accountable
if he holds both tasks: with two tasks there is a ”bundling” problem,
and voters cannot punish poor performance in only one of the two tasks.
Since ex-ante the politician is uncertain about his abilities in both tasks,
his incentives to please the voters are weaker than if he has control of
only one task. To put it another way, with two tasks the politician
faces more uncertainty about whether or not his random abilities will
be enought to please the voters. And as noted in the previous section,
more uncertainty dilutes the politicians’ incentives - see the discussion
after equation (9). This creates a general bias against delegation: for
instance, the politician may refrain to delegate task 2, even if it is costly
to perform, so as to get away with less eﬀort (or more rents) in task 1.8
Second, this bias against delegation is stronger if the two tasks require
similar abilites. Speciﬁcally, suppose that, if the politician retains both
tasks, the random abilities that determine his performance, θ1 and θ2,
are positively correlated. Then uncertainty about re-election prospects
is larger, the more so the greater is the correlation between these two
random variables. More uncertainty dilutes the politicians’ incentives,
and this increases his willingness to retain both tasks. Thus, coeteris
paribus the politician is more willing to retain a bundle of similar tasks,
such as foreign policy and foreign aid, or immigration policy and security,
while he is more likely to delegate tasks that require very diﬀerent sorts
8When the politician retains both tasks, the optimality condition for eﬀort in task
i c a ns t i l lb ew r i t t e na si n( 9 ) ,f o ri =1 ,2, except that now the density n(.)o nt h el e f t






10of skills from the core tasks that he retains.9
Third, in his choice of whether or not to delegate, the politician will
also pay attention to the presence of unobserved positive or negative
externalities between tasks. Speciﬁcally, suppose that performance in
t a s k2i sa l s oa ﬀected by eﬀort devoted in task 1, as follows:
y2 = θ2 + a2 + γa1
where γ>0( < 0) denotes the presence of a positive (negative) exter-
nality. If the politician retains both tasks, then his choice of eﬀort in
task 1 will reﬂect the presence of the externality. Accordingly, eﬀort in
task 1 will be greater with a positive externality (γ>0), smaller with a
negative externality (γ<0).10 Delegation induces the politician to ne-
glect the externality (positive or negative), since his re-election will now
depend on his perfromance in task 1 only. This in turn implies that the
politician is more willing to delegate task 2 in the presence of positive
externalities (γ>0), and less likely to delegate it in the presence of
negative externalities (γ<0). Intuitivey, positive externalities increase
equilibrium eﬀo r t ,a n dt h i si sp r e c i s e l yw h at the politician dislikes.
All these results point in the same direction. When the choice of dele-
gation is made by opportunistic politicians, there is nothing that insures
that the outcome will be socially optimal. On the contrary, politicians
will choose arrangements that wekan their incentives and reduce their
accountability - exactly the opposite of what would be socially optimal.
The implications of Proposition 1 are striking: if the choice of task allo-
cation does not inﬂuence the election outcome, then voters’ welfare is not
a relevant determinant of this choice. Politicians will delegate tasks that
require attention and costly eﬀort, while they will retain tasks that allow
them to grab political rents. The issue of what is in the voters’ interests
simply does not enter the political calculus of costs and beneﬁts.
Alternative assumptions would deliver diﬀerent results relative to
Proposition 1. In particular, if voters were uninformed about task allo-
cation, or if institution design also signalled the politician’s ability, then
the result in Proposition 1 need not hold. But the assumption that voters
only hold politicians responsible for the tasks that they have retained,
and adapt their expectations to what politicians in the opposition would
9If tasks 1 and 2 require correlated abilities, then the density n(.)o nt h el e f t
hand side of (9) evaluated at the mean is n(2¯ θ)=1 /[2σθ
p
π(1 + ρ)], where ρ is the
correlation coeﬁcient. Hence, a larger ρ reduces the density and weakens incentives.
10This result follows easily from adapting the politician’s optimization problem
discribed in the previous section to this richer set up. A formal proof is available
upon request.
11deliver (i.e. to what is ”politically feasible”) seems reasonable to us.11
Note that in the extreme case in which politicians can always and per-
fectly claim praise when things work out well and deﬂect criticisms to
bureaucrats when things do not, they would delegate everything and
simply pick what to claim responsibility for. Some of this indeed hap-
pens, and we return to this below; but clearly this is not the arrangement
we observe in practice because there is a limit on what voters can be
made believe; and in that case it is not clear who would want to be a
bureaucrat!
4 Redistribution
Is the politician more likely to retain under his control policies that entail
redistribution among voters, or policies with no redistributive implica-
tions? To answer this question, we now consider a purely redistributive
policy, ”cake splitting”. Consider three voters indexed by J, the mini-
mum number required to make the problem interesting. One of the two
policy tasks, say task 2, delivers a ”cake” that can be divided between
the three voters:





where cJ is the share allocated to voter J. The other policy task, task
1, is still described as before and entails no redistribution. Thus, the
overall utility function for voter J is U(y1,c J)=y1 + cJ for J =1 ,2,3.
To simplify the analysis, we constraint the politician to delegate to a
bureaucrat one of the two tasks. But the politician himself chooses
which task to delegate, whether the redistributive task or the task with
no redistribution. As before, voters know and understand who dose what
and hold the politician accountable only for the task under his control.
If the politician retains control of the simple policy task, then the
analysis is similar to that discussed above in section 2. In equilibrium
he is reelected with probability 1/2, and puts eﬀort in his task according
to (9) above. Redistribution is then carried out by the bureaucrat.
Suppose instead that the politician chooses to retain control of the
redistributive task, and delegates the simple (non-redistributive) task to
11Diﬀerent results would also apply under a diﬀerent voting behavior. For instance,
in Ferejohn (1986) model of moral hazard, voters coordinate on an optimal voting
strategy and punish the incumbent for choices contrary to their interest. Voters’
contol is limited by the incentive constraint that the incumbent must prefer to be re-
elected and please the voters, rather than grab as much rents as possible and forego
reelection. Applying that voting strategy here would give the voters some (but not
full) control over the constitution.
12the bureaucrat. Since the politician only needs to please a majority to
win re-election, he gives y/2t ot w ov o t e r sa n dz e r ot ot h et h i r do n e .
Hence, his reward is:
R
P(a)=P rob(y/2 ≥ W)( 1 1 )
where W is the reservation utility of individual voters. Implicit in (11) is
the assumption that voters expect that the incumbent, if re-elected, will
maintain the same redistribution observed today - i.e. he will split the
cake in half between the voters who re-elect him. With forward looking
and rational voters, W equals the average expected utility they can get
if the opponent is elected.
In order to decide how to vote, the voters need to compare the re-
distributive scheme of the incumbent versus that of the challenger. One
reasonable assumption is that the incumbent’s redistributive preferences
are more well know to the voters than those of the challenger. Having
been in oﬃce already, the incumbent has had the possibility of building
some credible coalitions. On the contrary, the challenger has not had
such opportunity and he can only at most make promises, which are
not necessarily credible12. One simple way of capturing this asymmetry
between challenger and incumbent is that while the latter is credibly
committed to a redistributive coalition, the former is not. In this case
t h ev o t e r sh a v e” ﬂat” expectations about the redistributive scheme of
the challengers. Therefore we can assume that if the challenger wins,
we have that W =
¡¯ θ − ae¢
/3, namely all the voters have a reservation
utility equal to getting 1/3 of the ”pie”, which is what they expect to
get from the challenger.
Going through the usual steps, of maximizing with respect to ef-
fort for given expectations and then imposing rational expectations, in







P)( 1 2 )
where n(z) denotes the normal density evaluated at point z. By com-
paring (12) with (9), we see that if the politician retains control of re-
distribution, he can get away with less equilibrium eﬀort. The reason is
that here he only needs to please two voters out of three. He can thus
reduce eﬀort, and still please two voters with the portion of the cake
taken away from the minority.13
12See Alesina (1988) for a discussion of credibility of campaign promises.
13This result is similar to that obtained in Ferejohn (1986) and Persson and
Tabellini (2000). But since here voters are forward looking, we rule out the Bertrand
competition among voters that instead features in the backward looking voting equi-
librium of Ferejohn (1986).
13Note that the asymmetry of expectations between challenger and in-
cumbent creates an incumbency advantage and dilutes the politician’s
incentives: the voters are more willing to reappoint the incumbent even
if he is incompetent, because they are sure they can beneﬁtf r o mh i s
redistributive scheme. Here we assumed a very stark asymmetry: no
uncertainty at all about how the incumbent will redistribute, and maxi-
mal uncertainty about the opponent. But the nature of the results would
be preserved with less stark assumptions, as long as voters are more un-
certain about the redistributive policies of the opponent compared to
those of the incumbent.14
These considerations capture the phenomenon of ”entrenched incum-
bents”. Even though they may not be that good for the collectivity, they
keep being reelected because they formed a solid block of support. From
a model of this kind one may get a formalization of the beneﬁts of term
limits. We can summarize the above discussion in the following:
Proposition 2 The politician always retains control of the redistributive
task
The result squares well with what we observe. Unlike monetary pol-
icy or aspects of regulatory policies, where bureaucratic delegation is
often exploited, ﬁscal policy is always under the direct control of polit-
ical representatives. While both monetary policy and regulatory policy
entail redistribution, ﬁscal policy is eminently much more redistribu-
tive than any other policy task, and for the reasons illustrated above
politicians ﬁnd it expedient to retain it under their direct control.
Note that, from the point of view of optimal policymaking, several
of the arguments in favor of delegation of monetary policy to an inde-
pendent bureaucrat (the Central Banker) apply to ﬁscal policy as well
(see Blinder 1997 for instance). Fiscal policy if full of problems of com-
mitment, probably even more so than monteray policy. While monetary
policy is delegated, and often this delegation is rationalized precisely for
a need of commitment, the same argument is not made for ﬁscal pol-
icy. Our model explains why ﬁscal delegation is much more rare than
monetary delegation.
14Indeed, if the voters were certain to be included in the winning coalition by
the opponent, their reservation utility would be W =( θ + ae)/2. In this case the
eﬀort of the incumbent would coincide with (12) and there would be no dilution
of eﬀort due to redistribution. Drazen and Eslava (2004) derive this feature, that
voters expect the incumbent’s reditributive policies to continue while they are more
uncertain about the opponent’s redistribution, as an equilibrium result.
144.1 Special interests
Some policies, such as trade policy, touch the interests of small but or-
ganised groups with policy preferences in conﬂict with those of the vast
majority of the voters. Criteria of political expediency here are some-
what diﬀerent, because the reward to the politician in this case entails
gifts or campaign conributions, rather than consensus building with vot-
ers at large. Suppose for simplicity that the lobby group is suﬃciently
small so as to be ignored in the vote counting of elections. Therefore
if the vote counting were the only consideration, the group would be
ignored. But with campaign contributions or gifts, the lobby group may
allow the politicians to increase his chances of reelection by buying time
on the media and the like. In our model this could be modelled with
the assumption that larger campaign contributions reduce the reserva-
tion utility of voters, allowing the politician to allocate eﬀort towards
the task preferred by the organised interest without compromising his
chances of re-election.15
Does the politician want to delegate away these kind of policies?
The answer is ambiguous, and depends on the bargaining power of the
lobby vs the politician. If the lobby has all the bargaining power (for
instance because there are no or few other competing lobbies in that
policy area), then the politician has little to gain in retaining control of
those policies, since any surplus would be approriated by the lobby. In
this case, he is willing to delegate the task to an independent bureaucrat.
If instead the poliymaker in charge has bargaining power against the
lobby, then delegation is less likely, since the politician can extract rents
or other beneﬁts from the organised lobby. The general prediction here,
therefore, is that we are are likely to see delegation of policies towards
special interest when the lobby is very strong, and instead we are likely to
see political control when the organised interests ﬁght against each other
to obtain policy favors. Trade policy is a good example of a policy area
that is often very politicized (i.e. not delegated), because it can generate
massive campaign contribution from competing industries that demand
protection. Regulation of a single industry, instead, is more likely to
give rise to bureaucratic delegation, since here the special interests do
not ﬁght each other but all demand the same policy, and thus are more
likely to have strong bargaining power against the policymaker in charge.
15Alesina and Tabellini (2004) study this case from a normative perspective, asking
what is the socially optimal arrangement in t h ep r e s e n c eo fo r g a n i s e di n t e r e s tt h a t
can bribe both policymaker types (bureaucrats or politicians), but can only oﬀer
campaign contributions to politicians.
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We now investigate whether the politician is more keen to delegate
”risky” or ”safe” tasks. The former is one in which the outcome is
determined not only by talent and eﬀort deterministically but also by
random elements, force of nature, luck, etc. In order to make this issue
interesting we need to have risk averse voters, otherwise risk would be
irrelevant for them. Therefore now we assume that the utility function
o ft h ev o t e r si sc o n c a v e :
u = u(y1)+u(y2)
The utility function is separable for simplicity and the function u(.)
is increasing and strictly concave. Task 1 is ”safe” and its outcome is
determined as before by talent and eﬀort only: y1 = θ1 + a1. Task 2 is
”risky”, in that performance (and thus voters’ utility) also depends on
a random exogenous component:
y2 = θ2 + a2 + ε;( 1 3 )
where ε is random variable with mean zero and variance σε;v o t e r so n l y
observe y1 and y2, but do not observe ε.
Suppose that the politician retains the safe task and delegates the
risky one. His ability θ is then fully revealed to the voters when they
observe y1. At the election, the voters thus anticipate that re-electing the
incumbent gives them utility u(θ+ae). Voting for the unknown opponent,
instead, gives the voters an expected utility of Eu(θ + ae), where the
expectations operator is over the random variable θ. The equilibrium
probability of re-appointment is thus:
Pr[u(θ + a
e) ≥ Eu(θ + a
e)] (14)
where now the probability refers to the random variable θ (since the
incumbent still ignores his own ability when setting policy and when
choosing the task allocation). The probability in (14) is clearly above
1/2, because of concavity of u(.), the more so the greater is the uncer-
tainty over θ and the more concave is the utility function.16 In other
words, when voters are risk averse, the incumbent enjoys an electoral
advantage.17 The reason is that the voters know more about the incum-
bent than about the opponent, and this makes them more reluctant to
switch. But the size of the incumbency advantage depends on which
tasks are retained by the politician.
16This can be seen by noting that Pr
£
u(θ + ae) ≥ u(¯ θ + ae)
¤
=1 /2, and that
Eu(θ + ae) <u (¯ θ + ae)b ys t r i c tc o n c a v i t yo fu(.).
17This result is related to Shepsle (1972).
16Speciﬁcally, suppose that the politician delegates the safe task and
retains the risky one. Now, the voters can no longer infer the incumbent
ability from their observation of y2. Reappointing the incumbent thus
gives the voters an expected utility of E(u(θ + ae) | θ + ε), where the
expectations operator refers to the expectation over θ, conditional upon
observing θ+ε. The expected utility of voting for the opponent, instead,
is unchanged (by the assumption that there is no commitment and after
the election the politician retains the safe task for himself). Hence, the
equilibrium probability of reappointment is:
Pr[E(u(θ + a
e) | θ + ε) ≥ Eu(θ + a
e)] (15)
where now the probability refers to the random variable θ2+ε. By strict
concavity of u(.), and since the unconditional mean of ε is 0, we have that
u(θ+ae) >E (u(θ+ae) | θ+ε) for all values of θ. Thus, the probability in
(15) is strictly smaller than that in (14) - i.e. the incumbency advantage
is smaller if the politician retains the risky task rather than the safe one.
We cannot conclude from this comparison that the politician prefers
to retain the safe task for himself, however. The reason is that equilib-
rium eﬀort is generally higher under the safe task: since the politician
faces less uncertainty, he ﬁnds it optimal to put more eﬀort into the safe
task than in the risky one.
The idea is that, with imperfect monitoring, equilibrium eﬀort is
lower since voters are less sure of how much the ﬁnal outcome can be
explained by eﬀort, ability or luck. On the other hand, when voters can
perfectly disentangle eﬀort and ability (since there is no luck involved)
the politician has to put in more eﬀort to be reelected18.
We summarize the foregoing discussion in the following:
Proposition 3 T h ec h o i c eb e t w e e nt h es a f ea n dt h er i s k yt a s ke n t a i l s
a trade-oﬀ between votes and rents (or eﬀort). By keeping the safe task
and delegating the risky one, the politician increases his incumbency ad-
vantage but decreases equilibrium rents (increases equilibrium eﬀort).
Thus, voters’ risk aversion makes the politician more willing to del-
egate risky tasks. Intuitively, the politician is aware that risk averse
voters punish bad luck more harshly than they reward good luck. He
thus prefers to leave this risk to the bureaucrat. In some sense, the bu-
reaucrat acts as a ”scapegoat” for the politician, as suggested by Fiorina
(1977), or to be more precise as a risk taker for the politician. This in-
centive is tempered by the opposite considerations concerning rents (or
18See Alesina and Tabellini (2004) for a discussion of how the politician’s incentives
are diluted in the presence of imperfect monitoring.
17eﬀort), however, since more risky tasks are also associated with greater
rents.
This line of analysis could be extended to analyze two related issues.
First, sometimes scapegoats or risk takers for politicians can be welfare
improving, since they take the blame for ”unpopular” but needed poli-
cies. In Europe, national politicians often publicly blame bureaucrats
in the European Commission that tie their hands, but in private they
sometimes welcome these constraints and may even suggest to the Com-
mission how to formulate its recommendations. A similar role may be
served by other international bureaucracies, such as the IMF, when it
prescribes so called ”unpopular” policies to macroeconomically unstable
countries (Vreeland 2003).
Second, this result is also relevant for other institutional choices be-
sides delegation, and in particular for the design of more or less trans-
parent procedures for policy formation. Transparency of public policy
is an important dimension of institutions and it is ultimately a choice
variable. Politicians can make a policy process more or less transpar-
ent and in this choice, they are likely to face a trade-oﬀ similar to that
summarized in Proposition 3. More transparency has the beneﬁto fi n -
creasing the incumbency advantage, because the voters are better able
to assess the qualities of the incumbent, while they know less about the
opponent. But more transparency is also likely to reduce equilibrium
rents, because the punishment for rent extraction is more severe. De-
pending on which incentives are likely to prevail, politicians will choose
more or less transparent procedures. An interesting application of this
idea is to the budget process. In many countries the government bud-
get is very non transparent and this is considered a ”problem” from the
point of view of optimality of institutions. But the degree of budget
transparency is entirely endogenous and it is the result of politicians’
strategic choices. In fact the government budget is the primary source
of rents broadly deﬁned for politicians. Otherwise there would be no
reason not to simplify the budget documents and the budget process.19
6 Conclusions
There are several ”good” (i.e. socially optimal) reasons why politicians
may want to delegate activities and decisional power to bureaucrats. In
practice, politicians do delegate, but in many cases not for the ”right”
reasons and so they do not delegate the ”right things”. The design of in-
19See Alesina and Perotti (1999) for a survey of the literature on budget institution
and of transparency. Alesina and Cukierman (1991) discuss a diﬀerent model in which
also the degree of transparency can be chosen endogenously by politicians who would
not always choose the maximum level of this variable.
18stitutions with reference to delegation is geared toward maximizing rents
at the lowest risk for the incumbent politician. This motivation leads
politicians to retain under political control policy tools that are useful
to build winning coalitions or to generate campaign contributions, such
as trade policy or much of ﬁscal policy. It also means that politicians
might want to delegate tasks that expose them to risk, with fewer of the
above advantages, such as monetary policy. But this ”risk shielding” is
possible only if bureaucratic delegation is complete, so that the blame
for policy failure lies with the independent agency and not the politician.
In our view the right question is not really whether in practice there
is too much or too little delegation, but whether the structure of dele-
gation, i.e. what is delegated and what not is, close or far from what is
socially optimal. In this paper we have suggested several reasons why
the structure of bureaucratic arangements that we observe in the real
w o r l di sl i k e l yt ob ev e r yd i ﬀerent from the social optimum.
19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider four cases: delegation vs no-delegation today, given that
the voters expect no-delegation after the elections; and delegation vs no-
delegation today, given that voters expect delegation after the elections.
Suppose that the voters expect that, after the election, the politician
will retain both tasks. Consider each of the two possible constitutional
arrangements for the current period. Under bureaucratic delegation
(i.e.. the politician is in charge of task 1 while the bureaucrat is in
charge of task 2), the probability of reappointment is: Pr(y1 ≥ W)( s i n c e
the ability of the incumbent politician in the second task is unknown,
it cannot inﬂuence the election outcome). If voters are rational and
fully understand the institutions in place, then their reservation utility
is: W = ¯ θ + ae. The equilibrium is then exactly as in section 2 above.
In particular, the probability of reappointment is: Pr(θ1 + aP
1 ≥ ¯ θ +
ae
1)=1 /2. If instead the politician keeps the second task for himself, and
given that the voters understand it, the probability of reappointment is:
Pr(y1 + y2 ≥ W)=Pr(θ1 + θ2 ≥ W − a1 − a2), where the reservation
utility is now given by: W =2 ¯ θ + ae
1 + ae
2. In equilibrium (i.e., with
aP
i = ae
i,i=1 ,2), the probability of reappointment is thus: Pr(θ1+θ2 ≥
2¯ θ)=1 /2.
Now suppose that the voters expect that, after the election, the
politician will delegate task 2 and only retain task 1. Here, the rele-
vant reservation threshold imposed by rational voters is: W = ¯ θ + ae
1,
since voters know that task 2 will not be controlled by the politician af-
ter the elections. Hence, the equilibrium probability of reappointment is
Pr(y1 ≥ W)=Pr(θ1 ≥ ¯ θ)=1 /2, irrespective of whether the politician
delegates or not before the elections.20
20Note that we have implicitly assumed that voters separately observe y1 and
y2; but this does not matter. If this was not the case, and in the case of no-delegation
voters only observed y1+y2, then the equilibrium probability of reappointment under
no-delegation would be Pr(θ1+θ2
2 ≥ ¯ θ), which is still equal to 1/2.
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